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NOTE
Informing Consent: Medical Malpractice and the
Criminalization of Pregnancy
Laura Beth Cohen*
Since the early 1990s, jurisdictions around the country have been using civil
child abuse laws to penalize women for using illicit drugs during their
pregnancies. Using civil child abuse laws in this way infringes on pregnant
women’s civil rights and deters them from seeking prenatal care. Child Protec-
tive Services agencies are key players in this system. Women often become
entangled with the Child Protective Services system through their health care
providers. Providers will drug test pregnant women without first alerting them
to the potential negative consequences stemming from a positive drug test.
Doing so is a breach of these providers’ duties to obtain informed consent from
their patients before administering medical tests. Malpractice liability can de-
ter providers from forcing women into the Child Protective Services system
and forestall the use of civil child protective laws to criminalize pregnancy.
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Introduction
In late July of 2014, Tammy Loertscher stopped using illicit drugs when
she realized she was pregnant.1 She had been self-medicating with
methamphetamine and marijuana since she lost her job and thus her ability
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1. Amended Complaint at 4, Loertscher v. Schimel, No. 14-cv-870-jdp, 2015 WL
5749827 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 11, 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-1936 (7th Cir. May 4, 2017).
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to pay for her much-needed thyroid medication.2 On August 1, she went to
the Taylor County Department of Human Services (DHS) for help finding
and paying for prenatal care and thyroid treatment.3 DHS sent her to a
nearby medical clinic.4 She told the clinic staff that she had used drugs, had
a thyroid condition, and suspected she might be pregnant.5 The staff asked
her for a urine sample, which she provided.6 She tested positive for
methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC.7 The clinic also determined
that Ms. Loertscher had severe hypothyroidism, depression, and fatigue.8
She agreed to enter the Behavioral Health Unit (BHU) for treatment.9
After she was admitted, clinic personnel shared Ms. Loertscher’s medical
records with DHS, a branch of the Wisconsin Department of Children and
Families.10 While Ms. Loertscher was in the BHU, her social workers repeat-
edly threatened her with civil confinement if she did not waive confidential-
ity regarding her medical records.11 They also told her that failure to
acquiesce to DHS’s demands would result in her baby being taken away
from her upon birth and put up for adoption.12 In the meantime, Taylor
County appointed an attorney to be the guardian ad litem for Ms. Loert-
scher’s fetus.13
On August 4, Ms. Loertscher attempted to leave the BHU but was not
permitted to do so because Taylor County had issued a custody order requir-
ing her to stay.14 At the time, Wisconsin had a law that allowed fetuses (and
thus women) to be taken into custody by the state if there was evidence of
prenatal drug use.15 On August 5, Taylor County convened a phone hearing
to determine whether it would detain Ms. Loertscher.16 The hearing in-
cluded counsel for Taylor County and the fetus’s guardian ad litem, but it
2. Loertscher v. Anderson, 259 F. Supp. 3d 902, 908 (2017).
3. Id. at 909.
4. Id. at 908–09.
5. Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 4–5.
6. Anderson, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 909.
7. Id.
8. Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 6.
9. Anderson, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 909.
10. Id.; Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 6.
11. Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 7.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 6–7.
14. Anderson, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 909–10; Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 7.
15. Anderson, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 907. The statute stated that Wisconsin could take cus-
tody of an unborn child whose “mother habitually lacks self-control in the use of alcohol
beverages, controlled substances or controlled substance analogs, exhibited to a severe degree,
to the extent that there is a substantial risk that the physical health of the unborn child . . . will
be seriously affected or endangered.” Wis. Stat. § 48.133 (1997). The Loertscher case is indic-
ative of the fact that fetuses and women were taken into custody without any showing of severe
substance abuse or risk to the health of the fetus.
16. Anderson, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 910.
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did not include legal counsel of any kind for Ms. Loertscher.17 During the
call, Dr. Jennifer Bantz, an obstetrician who had briefly met Ms. Loertscher,
provided Ms. Loertscher’s confidential medical information to the judge.18
At the end of the hearing, the county commissioner entered a custody order
against Ms. Loertscher which required her to remain in a treatment facility
for the duration of her pregnancy.19 No evidence was presented regarding
harm to the fetus.
Defying of the custody order, Ms. Loertscher checked herself out of the
clinic on August 7.20 Four days later, her fetus’s guardian ad litem filed a
motion for the Taylor County Court to hold Ms. Loertscher in civil con-
tempt.21 At the contempt hearing, Ms. Loertscher was again not provided
with legal counsel, and the fetus’s guardian ad litem “admit[ed] all of the
allegations against Loertscher” on behalf of the fetus.22 As a result, the court
held Ms. Loertscher in contempt and ordered her to check into an inpatient
treatment program or spend thirty days in jail.23
Ms. Loertscher ended up spending eighteen days in jail.24 During the
first few days of her incarceration she was denied her much-needed thyroid
medication.25 Then, when she experienced “cramping, pain, and vaginal dis-
charge,” her requests to see an obstetrician were denied.26 The jail physician
told Ms. Loertscher that there was “nothing” they could do about a miscar-
riage without first confirming the pregnancy, even though Ms. Loertscher’s
pregnancy was the reason she was in jail in the first place.27 When Ms. Loert-
scher refused to take a pregnancy test, she was placed in solitary
confinement.28
The solitary confinement cell was a room without windows containing
only a toilet and a metal bed frame. The room was cold and filthy. The
floor, walls, and toilet area had hair and feces on them, and there were
fingernails visible beneath the mattress frame. There was no mattress on
the bed. Ms. Loertscher was given only a roll of toilet paper. A guard pro-
vided a thin mattress and blanket in the evening and another guard took
these away first thing in the morning. Ms. Loertscher remained in this cell
for approximately 36 hours.29
17. Id.
18. Id. at 911.
19. Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 10.




24. Id. at 912.
25. Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 15.
26. Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 15; accord Anderson, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 912.
27. Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 16.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Ms. Loertscher was denied prenatal care for the duration of her incar-
ceration.30 DHS determined that Ms. Loertscher had committed civil “child
mistreatment” three months before she “delivered a healthy baby boy.”31
A Wisconsin district court recently held the law used to confine Ms.
Loertscher unconstitutional,32 but there are women all over the country with
experiences like Ms. Loertscher’s. These women face grave consequences
stemming from prenatal drug tests administered by their medical providers.
Like Ms. Loertscher’s obstetrician, these doctors and nurses do not alert
their patients to the adverse consequences that can stem from prenatal drug
testing, including civil confinement and losing custody of their children.
Medical providers owe a duty to their patients. Before administering a
test or performing a procedure, they must obtain their patients’ informed
consent.33 This means that providers must give enough information so that
their patients can make informed decisions about whether or not to undergo
a procedure.34 If providers take action without first obtaining informed con-
sent, they have committed malpractice and are consequently liable to their
patients.35 When providers perform prenatal drug tests without warning
their patients of the potential adverse consequences, they have failed to ob-
tain their patients’ informed consent to the tests and should be liable. Liti-
gants can use malpractice liability to stop providers from drug testing
pregnant women without their consent and thus forestall the use of child
protective laws in criminalizing pregnancy.36
This Note examines how litigants can strategically utilize malpractice
liability. Part I describes the political and legal circumstances surrounding
drug use during pregnancy in the United States. Part II explains the doctrine
of informed consent, including its normative underpinnings and jurisdic-
tional differences. Part III suggests a way in which litigants can use medical
malpractice litigation to stop medical professionals from drug testing preg-
nant women without their informed consent.
I. Examining the Legal and Political Processes Holding Women
Liable for Prenatal Drug Use
In the 1980s and 90s, a massive media frenzy endorsed the view that
crack use during pregnancy would create an inferior generation that would
30. Id. at 17.
31. Anderson, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 913.
32. Id. at 915–22.
33. See infra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
34. Id.
35. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
36. “Criminalizing” here is used as an umbrella term to refer generally to laws that aim
to police what women do during pregnancy using either civil or criminal sanctions. As will be
described infra, the sanctions can look similar in both the civil and criminal contexts. See also
Criminalizing Pregnancy: Policing Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs in the USA, Amnesty Int’l
(May 23, 2017), https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/criminalizing-pregnancy-policing-preg
nant-women-use-drugs-usa/ [https://perma.cc/Y65X-VWTZ].
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burden social services, especially the education system.37 For example, in
1989, Charles Krauthammer wrote in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette that “[t]he
inner-city crack epidemic is now giving birth to the newest horror: a bio-
underclass, a generation of physically damaged cocaine babies whose biolog-
ical inferiority is stamped at birth.”38
Recently, however, the studies that caused the “crack baby” panic have
been largely debunked; the effects they falsely attributed to cocaine are now
understood to stem from poverty.39 While alcohol and cigarettes have been
shown to have long-term adverse effects if used during pregnancy,40 the
same has not been shown to be true of other recreational substances, includ-
ing illicit drugs.41 At this point, crack, meth, opiates, and other illicit or
illicitly used drugs have not been shown to have significant, long-term ad-
verse effects on users’ children.42 Depending on the substance ingested, an
infant may experience withdrawal symptoms upon birth.43 For example, if
baby was exposed to opiates in utero, he or she may experience Neonatal
37. Am. Cong. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Toolkit on State Legislation:
Pregnant Women & Prescription Drug Abuse, Dependence and Addiction 2 [hereinaf-
ter ACOG Toolkit], https://www.acog.org/-/media/Departments/Government-Relations-and-
Outreach/NASToolkit.pdf?la=EN [https://perma.cc/9KNH-E7FL] (“Media reporting in the
1980s and early 1990s invented, promoted and perpetuated the [nonscientific] and highly stig-
matizing term, ‘crack baby.’ ”); see, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Children of Cocaine, Pitt.
Post-Gazette, Aug. 2, 1989, at 7, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1129&dat=1989
0802&id=zrFRAAAAIBAJ&sjid=W24DAAAAIBAJ&pg=6587,202482&hl=en (on file with the
Michigan Law Review).
38. Krauthammer, supra note 37.
39. ACOG Toolkit, supra note 37, at 2 (“Today, overwhelming scientific consensus
based on over 20 years of child development research has not identified a recognizable long-
term condition, syndrome or disorder that should be termed ‘crack baby.’ It is now under-
stood that poverty, poor nutrition and inadequate health care can account for many of the
effects popularly, but falsely attributed to cocaine.”).
40. See generally Joseph F. Hagan, Jr., et al., Neurobehavioral Disorder Associated with
Prenatal Alcohol Exposure, Pediatrics, Oct. 2016, at 1, http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/
content/early/2016/09/23/peds.2015-1553.full-text.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR37-LVWJ]; To-
bacco Use and Pregnancy, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.
gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/tobaccousepregnancy/index.htm [https://perma.
cc/7BKQ-NYMP].
41. Libby Copeland, Oxytots, Slate (Dec. 7, 2014, 7:52 PM), http://www.slate.com/arti
cles/double_x/doublex/2014/12/oxytots_and_meth_babies_are_the_new_crack_babies_bad_
science_and_the_rush.html [https://perma.cc/S5HK-Z6BG].
42. “There are drugs known to cause birth defects in developing babies, but they’re legal,
not necessarily what you’d expect, and definitely not what women are arrested for using. The
acne treatment Retin A, for instance, and antiepileptic drugs.” Id. (“Hendree Jones, a professor
at the University of North Carolina School of Medicine and expert in [neonatal abstinence
syndrome], says that from what she and other researchers have seen so far, once they’re
treated, the so-called oxytots appear to be like other babies. She points to a recent meta-
analysis showing that prenatal exposure to opioids ‘does not have deleterious effects on the
children, at least up to age 5.’ ”). Many of the adverse effects found in previous studies can be
explained by poverty. See ACOG Toolkit, supra note 37, at 2.
43. Children’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Parental Drug Use
as Child Abuse 2 (2015), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/drugexposed.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SR4M-G3HS].
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Abstinence Syndrome (NAS).44 But, if treated properly, even NAS has not
been shown to pose long-term health risks.45 Scientists have reached similar
conclusions regarding cocaine,46 crack,47 methamphetamine,48 and
marijuana.49
In the midst of this “crack baby” frenzy, a number of states looked for
ways to penalize drug use during pregnancy.50 Two routes presented them-
selves: the criminal justice system and the civil child protective system.51
Prosecutors in a variety of jurisdictions have attempted to use existing crimi-
nal statutes to try to punish prenatal drug use.52 These efforts have been
generally unsuccessful,53 but the South Carolina and Alabama supreme
courts have nonetheless endorsed these tactics.54 Additionally, some states
have passed affirmative statutes that either add fetuses to the list of potential
victims for existing crimes or explicitly criminalize drug use during
pregnancy.55
44. ACOG Toolkit, supra note 37, at 2–3.
45. Id. at 2 (“Unlike neonatal exposure to maternal alcohol and tobacco use, there have
been no reported long term effects of maternal opioid use on the developing child. Longitudi-
nal studies over 5 to 10 years have shown that children who experienced NAS as infants do not
exhibit signs of physical or cognitive impairment as they mature.”).
46. Maia Szalavitz, How Drug Laws Aimed at Pregnant Women Penalize Their Children,
Verge (Mar. 25, 2016, 12:15 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/3/25/11301898/prenatal-
drug-testing-custody-laws-child-welfare [https://perma.cc/P899-3GJC] (“Though using illicit
drugs while pregnant is obviously potentially dangerous and best avoided, the most common
recreational drugs that have been studied—like marijuana and cocaine—are not typically
linked with irreparable damage.”).
47. See supra note 39.
48. Copeland, supra note 41.
49. See Szalavitz, supra note 46.
50. Erik Eckholm, Case Explores Rights of Fetus Versus Mother, N.Y. Times (Oct. 23,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/24/us/case-explores-rights-of-fetus-versus-
mother.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“Courts in more than 20 states have
blocked the use of criminal child-abuse or related laws against pregnant women.”). It is impor-
tant to note the misogynist underpinnings of such state actions. They have been said to be
based on the idea that it is “morally egregious” for a woman to pursue any kind of pleasure at
even a slight risk to her fetus. Copeland, supra note 41.
51. Kenneth A. DeVille & Loretta M. Kopelman, Moral and Social Issues Regarding Preg-
nant Women Who Use and Abuse Drugs, 25 Obstetrics & Gynecology Clinics of N. Am.
237, 239–41 (1998).
52. See Guttmacher Inst., Substance Use During Pregnancy, https://www.guttmacher.
org/state-policy/explore/substance-abuse-during-pregnancy [https://perma.cc/RG89-WCTC]
[hereinafter Guttmacher State Overview].
53. See generally Krista Stone-Manista, Protecting Pregnant Women: A Guide to Success-
fully Challenging Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions of Pregnant Drug Addicts, 99 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 823 (2009); Cara Angelotta & Paul S. Appelbaum, Criminal Charges for Child
Harm from Substance Use in Pregnancy, 45 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. Online 193 (2017).
54. Guttmacher State Overview, supra note 52.
55. See Melissa Jeltsen, Tennessee to Decide if It Will Keep Criminalizing Pregnant Women
for Drug Use, Huffington Post (Mar. 8, 2016, 12:39 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/tennessee-criminalize-pregnant-women-drug-use_us_56dee8f9e4b0000de405c7f3 [https:
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States also use their civil child protective services (CPS)56 in a way that
punishes women who use drugs during pregnancy.57 CPS agencies vary state
by state, but three features of the systems remain largely constant. First, they
label women as child abusers, neglectors, or endangerers solely because of
drug use during pregnancy, even without any finding of actual harm to any
children or fetuses or any finding of intent.58 Second, when a woman is
labeled an abuser, she can lose custody of the children she already has or of
the baby once it is born.59 Finally, in order to regain custody, a woman must
navigate a complex and costly civil court system, often without the benefit of
legal counsel, unless she can pay for it herself.60
Despite ostensibly being intended to help children and families, these
policies adversely affect both pregnant women and their children.61 Women
are, at times, forced to stop drug use and go through withdrawal without
medical aid. This can be dangerous to both the mother and the fetus.62 CPS
agencies have been hostile to addiction treatment protocols, like the use of
methadone or suboxone, despite the medical community’s wide acceptance
//perma.cc/KC2Y-LLXZ]; Leticia Miranda et al., How States Handle Drug Use During Preg-
nancy, ProPublica (Sept. 30, 2015), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/maternity-drug-
policies-by-state [https://perma.cc/P58R-ERR3]; see also Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39–13–101 to
–102 (2016).
56. States vary in the nomenclature of their respective civil child protective agencies. For
the purposes of clarity and succinctness, I use “CPS” as a catchall.
57. See Guttmacher State Overview, supra note 52.
58. Id.; Copeland, supra note 41 (describing an Ohio case where a woman was taken “to
court [by CPS] for civil child abuse and neglect”). Even if a finding of harm were required,
holding women liable (civilly or criminally) for their pregnancy outcomes is highly problem-
atic. First, doing so would severely restrict pregnant women’s autonomy. Medical recommen-
dations for what pregnant women should or should not do are often confusing or
contradictory. If women can be held liable for harming their fetuses with illicit drugs, then
why not hold them liable because they had a glass of wine or ate a piece of sushi or exercised
too much or too little? See Emily Oster, Take Back Your Pregnancy, Wall St. J.: Saturday
Essay (Aug. 9, 2013, 6:31 PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/take-back-your-pregnancy-
1376087501 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). Second, despite best efforts, things go
wrong during pregnancy. Turning miscarriages into criminal investigations is cruel and can
discourage women from seeking care during medical emergencies. See Lynn M. Paltrow &
Jeanne Flavin, Opinion, Pregnant, and No Civil Rights, N.Y. Times (Nov. 7, 2014), https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/opinion/pregnant-and-no-civil-rights.html (on file with the
Michigan Law Review).
59. Guttmacher State Overview, supra note 52 (“[S]everal states have expanded their
civil child-welfare requirements to include prenatal substance use, so that prenatal drug expo-
sure can provide grounds for terminating parental rights because of child abuse or neglect.”).
60. Id. (stating that “some states, under the rubric of protecting the fetus, authorize civil
commitment (such as forced admission to an inpatient treatment program) of pregnant
women who use drugs”); Copeland, supra note 41 (describing the Alicia Beltran case in which
Ms. Beltran was denied a lawyer despite the fact that her fetus was appointed a legal guardian).
There has been a push to expand the right to counsel to civil cases, but it has not yet reached
all states or all contexts. See Nat’l Coalition for Civ. Right to Couns., http://
civilrighttocounsel.org/about [https://perma.cc/K9JA-MEBY].
61. See Szalavitz, supra note 46.
62. Id.
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of prenatal use of these medications.63 Furthermore, involvement with CPS
can create significant risks for children. Not only can they face separation
from a birth parent, but children are also exposed to a heightened risk of
abuse when they are placed in the foster system.64
These injustices are compounded by the fact that these women are not
afforded the Fourth Amendment protections that the Constitution gives to
criminal defendants. Women are subject to urine or blood tests which would
be barred in a criminal context.65 The United States Supreme Court held in
Ferguson v. City of Charleston that it is unconstitutional for a hospital to
collude with law enforcement in order to utilize positive prenatal drug test
results to coerce women into treatment programs.66 In that case, a public
hospital in Charleston, South Carolina, conspired with law enforcement to
arrest and prosecute women who were using cocaine during pregnancy.67
The hospital staff tested patients for cocaine if the women met one of nine
criteria established by the hospital.68 If they tested positive, the hospital
would relay the results to law enforcement.69 The women could avoid arrest
only through agreeing to drug treatment, regardless of whether they actually
displayed an addiction problem or whether the fetus had been harmed.70
The Court held that obtaining these test results in order to provide them to
law enforcement without the informed consent of the mother violated the
Fourth Amendment.71 The Court noted that patients “undergoing diagnos-
tic tests in a hospital [expect] that the results of those tests will not be shared
with nonmedical personnel without [their] consent.”72
63. Id. (“Many social workers see maintenance therapy as the equivalent of taking street
drugs—despite the overwhelming medical consensus and the fact that once patients are stabi-
lized, they are not emotionally or cognitively impaired and can successfully parent, drive, and
even work high-level jobs. Worse, because family court judges are also often ill-informed
about maintenance therapy, women are increasingly losing custody of their children for taking
their medication exactly as prescribed.”).
64. See id.
65. Am. Cong. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Comm. on Health Care for
Underserved Women, Substance Abuse Reporting and Pregnancy: The Role of the
Obstetrician-Gynecologist (2011) [hereinafter ACOG Committee Opinion No. 473],
http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/Committee_Opinions/Committee_on_
Health_Care_for_Underserved_Women/Substance_Abuse_Reporting_and_Pregnancy_The_
Role_of_the_Obstetrician_Gynecologist [https://perma.cc/9YW5-G8KL]; David Evans, Drug
Testing Law, Technology & Practice § 2:11.
66. 532 U.S. 67, 70–72, 87 (2001).
67. Id. at 70–72.
68. The criteria were: lack of prenatal care; late prenatal care; incomplete prenatal care;
abruptio placentae; intrauterine fetal death; preterm labor of no obvious cause; intrauterine
growth retardation of no obvious cause; previously known drug or alcohol abuse; and unex-
plained congenital anomalies. Id. at 71 n.4.
69. Id. at 72.
70. See id. at 72–73.
71. Id. at 83–84.
72. Id. at 78.
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CPS actions, however, are civil, not criminal, so the protections offered
in Ferguson do not apply,73 in spite of the fact that there are many practical
similarities between women like Tammy Loertscher and the plaintiffs in Fer-
guson. They, similarly, were accused of using drugs while pregnant, and they
also faced harsh consequences, including imprisonment. The difference was
that Ms. Loertscher was not protected by the Fourth Amendment.
So protection for women like Ms. Loertscher must be found elsewhere
because criminalizing pregnancy has perverse results.74 First, it encourages
women to terminate wanted pregnancies.75 Since the “victim” of the drug
use is the fetus, terminating the pregnancy moots the mother’s civil or crim-
inal liability.76 Even if a woman has a planned pregnancy, the expense and
stigma of embroilment with CPS can make an abortion a potentially prefer-
able option.77 Second, criminalizing drug use during pregnancy can deter
women from seeking prenatal care.78 Women who use drugs during preg-
nancy, perhaps even more than those who do not, need prenatal care to
ensure the well-being of both themselves and their fetuses.79 These women
may forego care, however, if they fear that they will be drug tested by their
physicians and that the results will be given to CPS.80 Third, punishing
women fosters mistrust between pregnant women and their physicians.81
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) explains,
Legally mandated testing and reporting puts the therapeutic relationship
between the obstetrician-gynecologist and the patient at risk, potentially
placing the physician in an adversarial relationship with the patient. In one
study, women who abused drugs did not trust health care providers to
protect them from the social and legal consequences of identification and
avoided or emotionally disengaged from prenatal care.82
73. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
74. ACOG Committee Opinion No. 473, supra note 65 (“Substance abuse reporting
during pregnancy may dissuade women from seeking prenatal care and may unjustly single
out the most vulnerable, particularly women with low incomes and women of color.”).
75. ACOG Toolkit, supra note 37, at 4 (“Punitive laws may have the unintended effect
of encouraging women to end wanted pregnancies. Women who do not think they can over-
come a drug problem may seek to terminate a pregnancy to avoid arrest.”).
76. See Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 15.
77. See id. at 20.
78. ACOG Toolkit, supra note 37, at 3 (“Criminal penalties are more likely to deter
women from seeking beneficial health care than they are to protect children, reduce the use of
harmful substances, or further the States’ policy of combating prescription drug abuse and
diversion.”).
79. See ACOG Committee Opinion No. 473, supra note 65 (“Studies indicate that pre-
natal care greatly reduces the negative effects of substance abuse during pregnancy, including
decreased risks of low birth weight and prematurity. Drug enforcement policies that deter
women from seeking prenatal care are contrary to the welfare of the mother and fetus.”)
(footnote omitted).
80. ACOG Toolkit, supra note 37, at 3.
81. ACOG Committee Opinion No. 473, supra note 65.
82. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Despite ACOG’s stance, one way that women get swept into the CPS
system is through their medical providers.83 Individual practices and hospi-
tals have a wide variety of prenatal drug-testing protocols.84 Some have poli-
cies that look for certain risk factors and then only test women who fit these
criteria.85 Others leave testing completely to the discretion of individual
providers.86 Generally, low-income women and women of color are tested
and subsequently penalized more often than white or wealthy women,87 de-
spite the fact that drug usage rates do not vary significantly along racial or
socioeconomic lines.88
Before submitting to a drug test, pregnant women are not told that
there can be serious consequences flowing from testing positive for certain
drugs.89 Administering medical procedures without first obtaining informed
consent is medical malpractice.90 Part II examines the doctrine of informed
consent as part of medical malpractice.
83. Guttmacher State Overview, supra note 52 (“A number of states require health
care professionals to report or test for prenatal drug exposure, which can be used as evidence
in child-welfare proceedings. And in order to receive federal child abuse prevention funds,
states must require health care providers to notify child protective services when the provider
cares for an infant affected by illegal substance use.”).
84. See, e.g., Amy Yurkanin, Alabama Hospitals Have Less-than-Clear Intentions with
Drug Tests Leading to Arrests of Pregnant Moms, AL.com (Sept. 30, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://
www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/09/covert_drug_tests_child_abuse.html [https://perma.cc/
UZL9-54EN]; Crico, Clinical Guidelines for Obstetrical Services at Crico-Insured
Institutions (2017 ed. 1988), https://www.rmf.harvard.edu/-/media/Files/-Global/KC/PDFs/
Guidelines/crico-ob-guidelines-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/V272-TJF2]; Consent for Maternity
Services, Women’s Health Partners, LLC http://myobgynoffice.com/your-visit/2015.04.22_
WHP_Consent_for_Maternity_Services_Form_Security.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2TR-STE9].
85. For example, in Ferguson the criteria included whether and how often the woman
had received prenatal care, whether she had “abuse[d]” drugs or alcohol in the past, and
whether there were unexplained adverse birth events. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S.
67, 71–72 (2001).
86. Private practices and birthing centers have discretion regarding who they test so long
as they conform to federal law. See infra notes 143–144 and accompanying text.
87. See generally Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on
Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and
Public Health, 38 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 299 (2013).
88. ACOG Committee Opinion No. 473, supra note 65.
89. See, e.g., supra note 84 and accompanying text; Consent to Obstetrical Delivery, Val-
ley Hosp. (2006), http://www.valleyhealth.com/pdf/Consent%20for%20OB%20Deliveries-
Rev.%202-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/BCV9-ZNLQ]; Information About Maternidad La Luz,
Maternidad La Luz, http://www.maternidadlaluz.com/files/html/Informed_Consent_Eng.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7RGC-9Q2S].
90. Infra Part II. There are narrow exceptions to this doctrine. See e.g., infra note 133 and
accompanying text.
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II. The Doctrine of Informed Consent
Since the middle of the last century, the doctrine of informed consent
has played a key role in the arena of medical malpractice liability.91 Before
the doctrine of informed consent, the medical profession operated under a
paternalistic framework.92 The prevailing assumption was that whichever
course of treatment the doctor considered prudent would be the one that
was undertaken, with little or no input from patients.93 The doctrine of in-
formed consent combats this and requires doctors to inform their patients
so that those patients can make knowledgeable decisions regarding care.94
This involves presenting patients with all of the different treatment options95
(including refusal of care),96 their risks,97 and their benefits98 Failing to ob-
tain informed consent can subject physicians to liability for battery and/or
for medical malpractice, depending on the jurisdiction.99
There are two different standards for evaluating whether doctors have
sufficiently informed their patients: the reasonable physician or community
standard and the reasonable patient or materiality standard.100 American ju-
risdictions are approximately evenly split between these two standards.101
91. Parris v. Limes, 277 P.3d 1259, 1263 (Okla. 2012) (“This requirement [that a physi-
cian obtain informed consent for medical treatment] is as essential as a physician’s care and
skill in the performance of therapy.”); Arnold J. Rosoff, Book Review, 22 J. Leg. Med. 307
(2001) (reviewing Fay A. Rozovsky, Consent to Treatment: A Practical Guide, Third
Edition (2000)).
92. Peter M. Murray, The History of Informed Consent, 10 Iowa Orthopaedic J. 104,
109 (1990), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2328798/pdf/iowaorthj00024-01
07.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TCL-9YEN].
93. Monya De, Towards Defining Paternalism in Medicine, AMA J. Ethics, Feb. 2004,
http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2004/02/toc-0402.html [https://perma.cc/W3ZW-J33G].
See also, Brian McKinstry, Paternalism and the Doctor-Patient Relationship in General Practice,
42 Brittish J. Gen. Prac. 340 (1992) (explaining the concept of paternalism as it occurs in
general medical practice).
94. Rosoff, supra note 91, at 310 (“The physician’s task—or so the law conceived it—was
to write upon a ‘blank slate’ and assure that the information the patient had was sufficient to
support the patient’s decision on treatment.”).
95. See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-d (1), (3) (McKinney 2017); Foote v.
Rajadhyax, 702 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
96. Rosoff, supra note 91, at 311 (describing the “right to refuse care” as the “ ‘flip-side’
of consent”).
97. Fournet v. Roule-Graham, 783 So. 2d 439, 444–45.
98. See Rosoff, supra note 91, at 308 n.3 (“To get an effective consent for treatment, the
physician must disclose to the patient information about (1) the diagnosis, (2) the nature and
purpose of the proposed treatment, (3) the risks and consequences of that treatment, (4)
reasonably feasible alternatives to the proposed treatment, and (5) the prognosis, if the recom-
mended treatment is not rendered.”).
99. See, e.g., Pizzalotto v. Wilson, 444 So. 2d 143 (La. Ct. App. 1983); McMichael v.
Howell, 919 So. 2d 18 (Miss. 2005); Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 505 (N.J. 1988); Belcher
v. Carter, 234 N.E.2d 311 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967); Tortorelli v. Mercy Health Ctr., Inc., 242 P.3d
549 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010)
100. Rosoff, supra note 91, at 308–09.
101. Id.
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The reasonable physician standard hinges on medical customs and standard
practices.102 The reasonable patient standard hinges on what a patient would
find to be material to the decision he or she must make.103 The amount of
information necessary to satisfy the doctrine under either standard fluctu-
ates by jurisdiction, but it has generally been becoming more rigorous as
medical technology becomes increasingly complex and patients become in-
creasingly savvy.104
The strength of the reasonable patient standard varies by jurisdiction.
Sometimes mere constructive knowledge that a patient “might have consid-
ered the information to be important” can create liability.105 Other jurisdic-
tions ask what information would be needed for a patient to make an
intelligent decision.106 And others ask that the patient be informed of “mate-
rial” facts regarding the procedure.107 Generally, the reasonable patient stan-
dard requires that patients have enough information to allow for “a
meaningful exercise of the patient’s self-determinative right.”108 Underlying
this standard is the desire to allow patients “to determine [ ] the direction in
which his [or her] interests seem to lie.”109
Likewise, the reasonable physician standard varies among jurisdictions.
In some places, physicians are held to the standard of a “skilled practitioner
of good standing.”110 Alternatively, some merely require compliance with
community or local standards.111 Depending on the practices of the immedi-
ate community, a mere reference to the existence of risks, with no details
about what they are in particularity, may be sufficient.112 The remoteness of
102. Id.; see, e.g., Lockett v. Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc., 42 N.E.3d 119, 129 n.11
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
103. Rosoff, supra note 91, at 309; e.g., Duffy v. Flagg, 905 A.2d 15, 20 (Conn. 2006).
104. Rosoff, supra note 91, at 309 (“Of course, under either standard, as medical progress
increases the store of knowledge about treatment options, risks, and treatment alternatives,
there will simply be more that patients want to know.”).
105. Marsingill v. O’Malley, 128 P.3d 151, 159 (Alaska 2006).
106. See, e.g., Rojas v. Barker, 195 P.3d 785, 788 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008); Saks v. Ng, 890
A.2d 983, 992 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); Flatt v. Kantak, 687 N.W.2d 208 (N.D. 2004).
107. See, e.g., D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 170 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Barclay v.
Campbell, 704 S.W.2d 8, 9–10 (Tex. 1986).
108. See, e.g., Geler v. Akawie, 818 A.2d 402, 417 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
109. E.g., Herrara v. Atl. City Surgical Grp., 649 A.2d 637, 640 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1994).
110. E.g., Jones v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 894, 901–02 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Arato
v. Aredon, 858 P.2d 598, 605 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (en banc)) (applying California law).
111. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-2816 (1976); Gorab v. Zook, 943 P.2d 423, 427–28
(Colo. 1997) (en banc); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1129–30 (Me. 1980); Curran v.
Buser, 711 N.W.2d 562, 568 (Neb. 2006).
112. See, e.g., Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
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the risk matters when evaluating whether the physician has behaved reason-
ably,113 as does the magnitude of the potential harm.114
Despite these differences in the modes of evaluation, both standards are
undergirded by the desire to ensure “respect for the dignity and autonomy
of individuals in the health care context.”115 The informed consent doctrine
seeks to enforce the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship.116
The purpose of the doctrine is to preserve bodily autonomy and self-deter-
mination for the patient.117 These rights extend to “every human being of
adult years and sound mind,” including pregnant women.118 The ability of
the patient to “exercise control over his or her body” is the very purpose of
this body of law.119 Whether or not liability attaches, patients have “the abso-
lute right, for whatever reason, to prevent unauthorized intrusions and
treatments.”120
113. See, e.g., Cowman v. Hornaday, 329 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Iowa 1983); Patten v. Gayle,
69 So. 3d 1180, 1187 (La. Ct. App. 2011); Leonhard v. New Orleans E. Orthopedic Clinic, 485
So. 2d 1008, 1013 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
114. See, e.g., Doerr v. Movius, 463 P.2d 477, 479 (Mont. 1970).
115. Rosoff, supra note 91, at 312; e.g., Roberts v. Connell, 718 S.E.2d 862, 864 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2011) (stating that informed consent “addresses the autonomy of a competent patient to
determine what medical treatment he [or she] will allow or refuse”) (quoting Pope v. Davis,
582 S.E.2d 460, 461 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)).
116. See, e.g., Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980) (“This duty to inform
stems from the fiduciary nature of the relationship.”); Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 170 P.3d
1151, 1155 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (“Under the doctrine of informed consent, a health care
provider has a fiduciary duty to disclose relevant facts about the patient’s condition and the
proposed course of treatment so that the patient may exercise the right to make an informed
health care decision.”).
117. 79 A.L.R.2d 1028 § 1 (1961) (“Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thor-
ough-going self-determination. It follows that each man [and woman] is considered to be
master of his [or her] own body, and he [or she] may, if of sound mind, expressly prohibit the
performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe
that an operation or form of treatment is desirable or necessary, but the law does not permit
him [or her] to substitute his [or her] own judgment for that of the patient by any form of
artifice or deception.”).
118. E.g., Rich v. Foye, 976 A.2d 819, 831 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) (quoting Duffy v. Flagg,
905 A.2d 15, 20 (Conn. 2006)); accord In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (“It has been
suggested that fetal cases are different because a woman who ‘has chosen to lend her body to
bring [a] child into the world’ has an enhanced duty to assure the welfare of the fetus, suffi-
cient even to require her to undergo caesarean surgery. Surely, however, a fetus cannot have
rights in this respect superior to those of a person who has already been born.”) (internal
citation omitted) (quoting John A. Roberts, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 Va. L. Rev. 405, 456 (1983)); Britt v. Taylor, 852 So. 2d 1128,
1134 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
119. Tinius v. Carroll Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1086 (N.D. Iowa 2004)
(applying Iowa law); accord Dunn v. Yager 58 So. 3d 1171, 1200 (Miss. 2011); Acuna v. Turk-
ish, 930 A.2d 416, 424–25 (N.J. 2007).
120. Rosales v. Loyola, 973 So. 2d 858, 863 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
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Such a sweeping doctrine collects even information that is collateral to a
procedure, like information that is specific to the provider and their skills.121
Informed consent also extends to merely diagnostic procedures,122 like drug
tests, even though they are minimally physically intrusive. So, information
like the legal consequences experienced by Ms. Loertscher should be covered
by the doctrine.123 If the purpose of the doctrine of informed consent is to
allow patients to have control over their futures, then it is intuitive that it
would cover whether test results will be disclosed to a government agency.
III. Strategic Application of Malpractice Litigation to Deter
Providers from Drug Testing Pregnant Women Without
Informed Consent
Under the reasonable patient standard, physicians can be held liable for
failure to secure informed consent before drug testing a pregnant woman.
Because Wisconsin uses the reasonable patient standard, the Tammy Loert-
scher case is illustrative. The clinic staff did not inform her that her private
medical records would be shared with a third party.124 They did not inform
her that interacting with CPS agencies has been shown to be likely to have
adverse consequences for both children and parents.125 They did not inform
Ms. Loertscher126 that she could be taken into legal custody, denied medical
care, prevented from taking her thyroid medication, and put at risk of losing
custody of her fetus before they administered the drug test. Even if the clinic
staff had no idea what the eventual consequences would be, they at least
knew that CPS would intervene in her life—an intervention that the clinic
staff gave Ms. Loertscher no opportunity to refuse. If they had told her any
of these things, it is reasonable to think that she would have declined to
submit to the test.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has described its consent standard as
emanating from “the personal liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”127 Wisconsin courts ask, “given the circumstances of the case, what
would a reasonable person in the patient’s position want to know in order to
make an intelligent decision with respect to the choices of treatment or diag-
nosis?”128 A reasonable person would likely want to know that the results of
a diagnostic test may be shared with a third party. A reasonable pregnant
121. E.g., Goodman v. United States, 298 F.3d 1048, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Mary-
land law); DeGennaro v. Tandon, 873 A.2d 191, 195 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
122. See, e.g., Garcia v. Robinson, 349 P.3d 415, 419 (Haw. Ct. App. 2015).
123. See Rosoff, supra note 91, at 309.
124. Amended Complaint, supra note 1 at 6.
125. See Szalavitz, supra note 46 (describing studies indicating that “[b]etween a third and
half of children who grow up in foster care report at least one experience of abuse or neglect”
and that “foster homes increase a child’s risk of sexual abuse”).
126. See Amended Complaint, supra note 1 at 6.
127. Outagamie Cty. v. Melanie L., 833 N.W.2d 607, 617 (citing Lenz v. L.E. Phillips
Career Dev. Ctr., 482 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Wis. 1992)).
128. Martin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Wis. 1995).
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woman would certainly want to know whether that third party had the legal
power to terminate her parental rights or confine her against her will.
Like many jurisdictions, Wisconsin does not find the distinction be-
tween treatments and diagnostic procedures to be necessarily relevant in in-
formed consent cases.129 As such, it does not matter that a urine test is
merely diagnostic—it still requires informed consent unless it falls within an
exception. Wisconsin courts also do not “believe that a physician is necessa-
rily absolved from providing pertinent medical information simply because
the procedure he or she recommends is noninvasive.”130 Furthermore, it
stands to reason that because “[i]nformed consent is fundamentally about
each person’s right to decide ‘what shall be done with his [or her] own
body,’ ”131 a drug test would fall within the doctrine in the prenatal context
because the consequences of a positive prenatal drug test can include depri-
vations of physical liberty.132
Wisconsin statute section 448.30 codified Wisconsin’s informed consent
standard and provided some exceptions to the standard:
(1) Information beyond what a reasonably well-qualified physician in a
similar medical classification would know.
(2) Detailed technical information that in all probability a patient would
not understand.
(3) Risks apparent or known to the patient.
(4) Extremely remote possibilities that might falsely or detrimentally
alarm the patient.
(5) Information in emergencies where failure to provide treatment would
be more harmful to the patient than treatment.
(6) Information in cases where the patient is incapable of consenting.133
The adverse effects of consenting to a drug test do not fall within any of
these exceptions. First, while it could be true that physicians lack legal exper-
tise and may not know the extent of possible adverse consequences, they
certainly know whether the results will be given to a third party. And the
very purpose of disclosing prenatal drug use to CPS is to ensure they will
intervene in the life of the pregnant woman. So, while Dr. Bantz, for exam-
ple, may not have known that Tammy Loertscher would end up in solitary
confinement for thirty-six hours, she certainly knew that Ms. Loertscher was
going to face some kind of legal intervention. Second, the risks are not ap-
parent to the pregnant patient. If women knew, generally, that testing posi-
tive for drugs could result in a loss of liberty or of custody of their children,
129. Martin, 531 N.W.2d at 78.
130. Id. at 79.
131. Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Compen. Fund, 813 N.W.2d 627, 635
(Wis. 2012) (quoting Martin, 531 N.W.2d at 76) (second alteration in original).
132. See Guttmacher State Overview, supra note 52 (showing states in which sub-
stance use during pregnancy is considered child abuse or grounds for civil commitment).
133. Wis. Stat. § 448.30 (1981), amended by 2013 Wis. Act 111 (Dec. 13, 2013).
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it is unlikely that any would acquiesce to the test.134 Third, because it is
providers themselves who decide whether or not to disclose any test results,
they cannot claim either that the possibility of disclosure is extremely remote
or beyond their knowledge. Lastly, pregnancy in and of itself does not
render a woman incapable of consenting (or declining to consent) to a
procedure.
Wisconsin sits at a key intersection. It uses the reasonable patient stan-
dard and it lacks any affirmative statutory requirement that medical profes-
sionals report prenatal drug use to a CPS agency. Fifteen other states also sit
in this intersection:
Table 1 displays three categories of states for the purpose of the type of
litigation proposed here. The fifteen Type 1 states are like Wisconsin—they
are reasonable patient jurisdictions without statutory duties to report posi-
tive prenatal drug tests. The Type 2 states are the reasonable physician juris-
dictions without statutory duties to report positive prenatal drug tests. The
Type 3 states are the states that do have affirmative prenatal drug test report-
ing requirements. Liability will be easiest to impose in Type 1 states and
most difficult to impose in the Type 3 states. The rest of this Part discusses
each category in turn.
In strategically tackling this issue, it would be prudent to begin with the
sixteen Type 1 states where liability is easiest to find.135 Inflicting financial
liability on doctors and hospitals is likely to change behavior. Furthermore,
merely hearing that other physicians in your state have been held liable for
the behaviors described above may induce providers to alter their policies in
order to avoid costly litigation. Thus, lawsuits need not be filed against every
doctor or hospital in each Type 1 state in order to change collective
behavior.
There are nineteen states that use the reasonable physician standard and
have no statutory prenatal drug use disclosure requirement.136 Liability
under the reasonable physician standard is more challenging to demonstrate
than under the reasonable patient standard. Obstetricians, at times, practice
medicine in an ethically complex situation where they feel they must serve
both the interests of the pregnant woman and her fetus. They might sin-
cerely feel that only an unreasonable pregnant woman would take into con-
sideration personal adverse consequences when faced with an option to take
a test that theoretically could improve the pregnancy outcome for the fetus.
134. If women begin self-selecting out of prenatal drug testing because they know they
will test positive, this could be a feature rather than a flaw in the strategy. But if states become
concerned that no testing is happening, they may begin to mandate blanket testing. This
would have perverse outcomes, as discussed elsewhere in this Note. See supra notes 75–82 and
accompanying text. It would also allow for constitutional challenges, which current practices
in the civil context have largely not.
135. See supra notes 125–134 and accompanying text.
136. These are the Type 2 states. See supra Table 1.
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Table 1137
Type 1 States



















States using the reasonable physician standard that do not mandate reporting 




















*Colorado and Georgia use a hybrid of reasonable physician and reasonable patient standards.
**Kentucky mandates testing of prenatal drug use but does not mandate reporting.
Type 3 States
States mandating reporting of prenatal drug use



















137. Data about the informed consent standard comes from David M. Studdert et al.,
Geographic Variation in Informed Consent Law: Two Standards for Disclosure of Treatment Risks,
4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 103, 106–09 (2007). Data about the legal duty to report prenatal
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Such ideas are fueled by stereotypical conceptions of pregnant women as
necessarily self-sacrificing.138 A jury may be likely to find a physician free of
liability for assuming that no woman would reasonably refuse a drug test
while pregnant, or that any pregnant woman who uses drugs is not compe-
tent to make medical decisions. Expert testimony to the contrary would be
key in these jurisdictions.
If the state uses the community standards approach, however, liability
would be slightly easier to show than in the pure reasonable physician con-
text. ACOG clearly states that physicians should obtain informed consent
from pregnant women before performing drug tests.139 ACOG’s medical
standards call for testing only in particular and rare cases, and still require
informed consent.140 They are vehemently opposed to providing CPS agen-
cies with medical information regarding prenatal drug use absent a showing
of actual abuse of living children or a specific statutory requirement.141 They
even encourage their providers to work to repeal legislation that requires
reporting prenatal drug use to CPS agencies.142 Because ACOG’s recommen-
dations aim to reflect best practices, their stance is convincing regarding the
community standards for prenatal drug testing. Furthermore, as liability is
imposed in the Type 1 states, it will only strengthen the argument that there
is a community standard regarding obtaining informed consent before pre-
natal drug testing.
In the Type 3 states, physicians have an affirmative statutory duty to
report prenatal drug use. The federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act requires reporting of infants who are born exhibiting signs of drug ex-
posure.143 But, these fifteen Type 3 states have gone beyond this to require
drug use comes from Miranda, supra note 55. Additionally, in Kentucky and Iowa, providers
have an affirmative statutory duty to test pregnant women if they suspect the woman is using
drugs. Id. Minnesota and North Dakota have a similar requirement if there are suspected
drug-related complications at birth. Id.
138. Copeland, supra note 41 (“The notion of a woman pursuing pleasure at the slightest
risk to her fetus is seen as morally egregious—hence our culture’s ban on sushi for pregnant
women, but not for the much more risky but workaday act of driving.”).
139. Am. Cong. Of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Comm. on Ethics, Alcohol
Abuse and Other Substance Abuse Disorders: Ethical Issues in Obstetric and Gyne-
cological Practice 2 (2015) [hereinafter ACOG Committee Opinion No. 633], https://
www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/co633.pdf?dmc=1 [https:/
/perma.cc/WG48-GCBC].
140. ACOG Toolkit, supra note 37, at 4–5.
141. ACOG Committee Opinion No. 633, supra note 139, at 5 (“Obstetri-
cian–gynecologists should function as patient advocates and oppose coercive screening, test-
ing, and treatment interventions and prosecution of a particular population for substance use
disorder. Obstetrician–gynecologists should protect patient autonomy, confidentiality, and the
integrity of the patient–physician relationship to the extent allowable by laws regarding disclo-
sure of substance use disorder.”).
142. Id. (“In states that mandate reporting, [policymakers], legislators, and physicians
should work together to retract punitive legislation and identify and implement evidence-
based strategies outside the legal system to address the needs of women with addictions.”).
143. Children’s Bureau, supra note 43.
May 2018] Informing Consent 1315
that tests showing prenatal drug use are reported to a CPS agency.144
Whether or not this statutory requirement alleviates a physician of their eth-
ical obligations to inform their patients before administering the test is un-
certain. It is possible that the physician’s duty to report does not override
their duty to obtain informed consent. Whether or not the physician has to
report the results of the test, the patient has a right to refuse the test in the
first place.
Physicians, however, are typically free from malpractice liability when
they adhere to mandatory reporting requirements.145 In some states,
mandatory reporting statutes even impose liability on physicians and other
mandatory reporters who fail to make reports.146 Given this carrot-and-stick
approach to mandatory reporting, it is unlikely a court would impose finan-
cial liability where a physician conformed to a statutory obligation.147 But if
standard medical practices in the other thirty-five states fall into line with
ACOG recommendations, then physicians and activists in the remaining fif-
teen states will have more ammo to use in convincing their state legislatures
to change practices.
There are also non-litigation-based actions that can help to change
medical practices in these Type 3 states. Alerting private practices and hospi-
tals that they can avoid malpractice liability by simply informing their pa-
tients that test results could be shared with CPS agencies may change
providers’ behavior.148 Arguments based on cost effectiveness are convinc-
ing. Informing patients costs almost nothing, while malpractice suits are ex-
pensive. Nonadversarial educational efforts aimed at changing attitudes
toward prenatal drug use could also be effective. Hospitals and obstetricians
want to maintain the trust of their patients and promote healthy birth out-
comes, so presenting them with evidence-based approaches will change their
behavior. Lastly, it is important to better educate providers about the legal
repercussions of prenatal drug testing. Doctors and nurses are probably
largely unaware of the magnitude of harm that can flow from a prenatal
144. See note 137 and accompanying table.
145. E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 51A(g) (2016) (“No mandated reporter shall be
liable in any civil or criminal action for filing a report under this section or for contacting
local law enforcement authorities or the child advocate, if the report or contact was made in
good faith, was not frivolous, and the reporter did not cause the abuse or neglect.”); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 37-1-410(a)(1) (2014) (“The health care provider shall not be liable in any civil
or criminal action that is based solely upon . . . [t]he health care provider’s decision to report
what the provider believed to be harm.”); W. VA. Code Ann. § 49-2-810 (LexisNexis 2015).
146. E.g., Iowa Code § 232.75 (2015); Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-207 (2015); N.Y. Soc.
Serv. Law § 420 (McKinney 2010); N.D. Cent. Code § 50-25.1-13 (2007); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2151.421 (LexisNexis 2017); 40 R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-11-6.1 (2006 & Supp. 2016).
147. The ethical issues here are beyond the scope of this piece. Suffice it to say that
whatever the statutory obligations of the medical professionals are, they ought not abrogate
physicians obligations to inform their patients, because they do not change the bodily auton-
omy of the patient.
148. The efficacy of this strategy in jurisdictions with a duty to report positive prenatal
drug tests will be lessened if that statutory duty abrogates or mitigates the patient’s right to
informed consent.
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drug test, and educating them may make them think twice before adminis-
tering the test at all.
Conclusion
Ms. Loertscher’s story is an extreme example, but she is far from the
only woman who has suffered shocking consequences after taking a prenatal
drug test. In the United States, women have faced imprisonment, injury, and
even death because their bodily autonomy was restricted during preg-
nancy.149 It is not a coincidence that policies like the one that imprisoned
Ms. Loertscher are favored by the forced-pregnancy150 movement.151 Like the
other policies favored by this movement, they are intended to restrict
women’s ability to exercise control over their bodies, and they have a starkly
disparate impact on poor women and women of color.152 Medical providers,
sadly, have become complicit. Pregnancy does not render a woman incapa-
ble of consenting to medical care or undeserving of bodily autonomy.153 De-
nying pregnant women bodily autonomy is not merely misogyny—it is
medical malpractice, and doctors should be held accountable.
149. See In re A.C. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (describing how a woman and her baby
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